Title and Abstract Proposal
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Metaphorical-Pragmatic Aspects of Knowledge in Peircean Writings:
Creative Pre-sequences

The central idea of this talk is that Peirce's pragmatism - that is, Pragmaticism -, in some version of the dictum of his pragmatic maxim, not only deals with including conceivable consequences in its analysis, but also contemplates the formative *pre-sequences* of ideas or objects that could eventually arise when comparing a feasible situation with an infinite number of similar ones, given the relevance of an analysis of everything that is conceivable.

Although the universe of the conceivable has an innumerable breadth, this field of imagination has a richness that is worthy of study, even when, in Peircean terms, they are labeled hypothetical, conjectural and, therefore, fallible *pre-sequences*, and, consequently, sometimes useless. However, this uselessness is unimportant compared to the value of the search for the flow of a fertile, fruitful and productive imagination (*uberty*, the word Peirce used about it, MS 682, EP 2: 463-474), such as the context of creativity. In relation to this, one of the most notable characteristics of the Peirce' approach is its conception of triadic knowledge, which includes an interpretant, not only as an observant subject of such a task, but as an active agent of cognitive production. The presence of a third active productive element, instead of the traditional subject-object dichotomy, brings with it a sense of perspectivism and dynamism that manifest a cognitive relationship much more enriched than the typical connection of a passive subject before a reality that impacts, i.e., a spectator theory of knowledge (Dewey, 1960: 23).

It is worth highlighting the metaphorical aspect that emerges in cases of creative production of objects of any kind, since creativity requires, as we will argue, the presence of iconic signs. And even more so, the presence of an agent who intervenes in producing such a task. In this sense, in this work we propose to discuss the creative role of incorporating metaphors in our cognitive discourses. More precisely, we explore the pragmatist idea that not only we do think through a set of metaphors but we also "weave" reality as spiders of knowledge from the creative introduction of new metaphors of the reality in which we are involved, to the extent that we advance in the search for solutions to our cognitive problems: "(…) concepts need to be clothed in (…) garments. For a pure idea without metaphor or other significant clothing is like an onion without a peel". (Peirce, 1998, EP 2: 392)

But what is pragmatist about the proliferation of metaphors in cognitive construction? This is where the Peircean perspective contributes its peculiar semiotic imprint. Relying on a Nietzschean and Rousseau idea that all thoughts are, in fact, metaphors at root, we assume an interpretation of Peirce concerning metaphors as products of fluid associations coming from usually different, but functionally coincident, domains. Metaphors that contribute to the creation of new ideas or objects, produced following pragmatic schemes. This leads us to differ with William James, as well as against the Cartesian foundationalist tradition of knowledge: Descartes insists on metaphors such as "chains or trains of thought." James, against this, speaks of fluidity of thought, as something that surpasses the classic static Cartesian foundationalism.

> Consciousness, then, does not appear to itself chopped up in bits. Such words as 'chain' or 'train' do not describe it fitly as it presents itself in the first instances. It is nothing jointed; it flows. A 'river' or a 'stream' is the metaphor by which it is most naturally described. In talking hereafter, let us call it the stream of thought, of consciousness, or of subjective life. (James, 1983, p. 233)

Our proposal states that it is neither the chains nor the fluidity of ideas separately, but rather two differentiated levels of them, applied in different contexts: while, for Peirce, on the one hand, all domains, no matter how different categorically are, they can be fluidly associated if functional elements arise that they share with each other. On the other hand, the associations themselves between two domains operate as chains that are no longer linear but reticular, that forge close links in initially unthinkable fields. The metaphorical task is then a fluid task and the linguistic task, on the other hand, consists of linear chains. This is where Peirce's pragmaticism relates to metaphorical fluidity. We will present an associationist model of creativity based on metaphors inspired on Peirce's writings.